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Justice Sotomayor‟s Undemocratic Dissent
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action
Adam Lamparello*
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”1
-

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS

“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial
discrimination.”2
-

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SONYA SOTOMAYOR
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INTRODUCTION

Does the Constitution compel states to desegregate their schools?
Yes.3
Does the Constitution compel states to recognize interracial
marriages?
Yes.4
Does the Constitution compel states to recognize same-sex marriage?
Arguably, yes.5
Does the Constitution compel states to treat people differently on the
basis of race?
No.
The way to stop judicial supremacy is for judges to stop acting like
judicial supremacists. The way to ensure equal and accessible democratic
processes is to make our democracy more equal and accessible. If the
Constitution gave nine members of the Supreme Court the authority to
undo the choices of millions simply to achieve better policy outcomes,
then the Court would have the power to make constitutional laws
unconstitutional and unconstitutional laws constitutional. That would
lead to inequality in a manner far worse—and more undemocratic—than
the alleged inequality that resulted from Michigan‟s ban on race-based
preferences. Citizens of all political persuasions would be subject to a
federal judicial veto, regardless of the Constitution, or the results of
democratic debate.
Justice Sotomayor‟s provocative dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action6—called “courageous” by Attorney General
Eric Holder7—rightfully argued for a candid discussion on race:
3

See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); U.S. CONST., amend. XIV,
§ 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
4
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
5
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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[W]e ought not sit back and wish away, rather than
confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society.
It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile
notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the
simple truth that race does matter.8
While courageous, the dissent was not correct.
Race does matter. The Supreme Court, however, is not the proper
venue to have this candid discussion. To imply that it should, and that the
Constitution should be interpreted with “eyes open,”9 is to suggest that
“we” refers to nine unelected judges, and that “ought” should be defined
by the federal judiciary. Neither view is healthy for democracy or
equality. “We” refers to the citizens of every state, and “ought” belongs
to the democratic process.
Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent, although noble in purpose, is
fundamentally undemocratic. As discussed below, the reasoning reflects
a philosophy that gives courts the power to make normative policy
judgments, and to condition constitutional meaning on subjective
assessments regarding the wisdom of state policy. There is no such thing,
however, as an unconstitutional policy. There is only an unconstitutional
law. And laws must comport with the Constitution‟s text, not the other
way around.
By authoring such a pointed, political, and doctrinally suspect
dissent, Justice Sotomayor made it more difficult to have a candid
discussion about race. She also made it more difficult to believe that
judges will respect the law—and the Constitution—even when it
conflicts with their personal values. That not only undermines the
public‟s faith in the Court, but it demeans every citizen‟s fundamental
right to resolve divisive policy issues through democratic means. To be
sure, it is one thing to invalidate democratically enacted laws that violate
constitutional liberties. It is quite another, however, to manipulate,
ignore, or unreasonably interpret the Constitution‟s text to reach a
desired policy outcome. The result does not lead to equality. It denies
citizens of all races the ability to have a principled discourse on divisive
6

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-83.
Todd Ruger, Sotomayor‟s Dissent was „Courageous,‟ Holder Says, LEGAL TIMES
(April 23, 2014 1:28 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=12026522
79348/Sotomayor‟s-Affirmative-Action-Dissent-Was-‟Courageous,‟-Holder-Says?slretur
n=20140403144037 (accessed by searching for LegalTimes in LEXIS NEXIS, legal
news).
8
Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration to original in
quoted text).
9
Id.
7
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social policy issues, and prevents citizens from being agents of change.
Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent, therefore, highlights the problem of relying
on the Court to create rights. With each decision removing an issue from
the democratic process, power is a bit more centralized, and liberty a bit
more federalized.
A candid discussion about race, however, is essential.
Discrimination—and its effects—exist throughout the country.10
Inequality is real, not imagined. Affirmative action, while valuable to
ensuring diversity in higher education, is an incomplete fix. It masks, but
does not alleviate, the deeper racial injustices that continue to this day.
Those injustices result from an inescapable truth: the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education11 has never been realized.12 African-Americans
continue to live in a world of unequal opportunity and, in some areas,
segregated schools. Many live in poverty and receive an inadequate
education. Enacting local, state, and federal policies that address the root
causes of inequality is thus a civil and human rights imperative. A
discussion that includes and empowers only nine judges, however, will
be anything but candid, most likely divisive, and most certainly
unproductive.

II.

SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In Schuette, Justice Kennedy authored a plurality opinion upholding
a constitutional amendment passed by Michigan voters (Proposition 2),
that banned race-based preferences among state and governmental
entities.13 The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action challenged the
10

Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration to original in
quoted text).
11
Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12
See Rotan E. Lee, Equality: Truth and Consequence, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 263 (1995) (discussing post-Brown failures, including poverty, inadequate
schooling, and segregation).
13
See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1678 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Proposition 2 was
passed by a fifty-eight to forty-two percent margin and became Article I, § 26, of the
Michigan Constitution. Section 26 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne
State University, and any other public college or university,
community college, or school district shall not discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.
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law, arguing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause by altering the
political structure and making it more difficult for minorities to effect
changes in policy.14 Before voters passed Proposition 2, the governing
bodies at Michigan‟s public universities administered affirmative action
programs.15 After Proposition 2 passed, minority groups could only seek
change through a statewide ballot initiative.16
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Michigan,
holding that its voters were permitted to limit the means by which
minority groups could secure advantages based on racial classifications.17
By a 2-1 vote, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Proposition 2
violated the equal protection clause.18 On re-hearing en banc, a divided
Sixth Circuit affirmed.19 The Court granted certiorari, and reversed.

A.

The Plurality Opinion
1. Deference to the Democratic Process

Justice Kennedy‟s plurality opinion emphasized that the issue “is not
about the constitutionality, or the merits, of race-conscious admissions
policies in higher education.”20 Instead, it concerned “whether, and in
what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the
consideration of racial preferences in governmental decisions, in
particular with respect to school admissions.”21 At its core, Schuette was
about who should decide: the Court or the democratic process; however,
it was about much more. The tide is beginning to turn against living
constitutionalists and policy-driven jurists. Even Justice Kennedy, who
has often crafted opinions filled with sweeping language about liberty,
agreed.
(3) For the purposes of this section „state‟ includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public
college, university, or community college, school district, or other
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the
State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.
14
Id. at 1682.
15
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of University of Mich., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924, 933 (E.D. Mich. 2008), overruled by Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
16
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
17
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630; see also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539
F.Supp. 2d at 933.
18
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (the Sixth Circuit relied, in part, on Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1998)).
19
Id. at 1630; see also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of
University of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012).
20
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.
21
Id.
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The plurality held that the United States Constitution gives this
choice to Michigan‟s voters. Relying on Grutter v. Bollinger,22 where the
Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School‟s affirmative
action program,23 Justice Kennedy emphasized “the significance of a
dialogue regarding this contested and complex policy question among
and within states.”24 Michigan‟s decision to ban race-based preferences,
“reflect[ed] in part the national dialogue regarding the wisdom and
practicality of race-conscious admissions in higher education.”25
Furthermore, by “enabling greater citizen involvement in democratic
processes,”26 the Constitution gave citizens the authority to make these
choices. Justice Kennedy explained as follows:
This case is not about how the debate about racial
preferences should be resolved. It is about who may
resolve it. There is no authority in the Constitution of the
United States or in this Court‟s precedents for the
Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this
policy determination to the voters . . . Deliberative
debate on sensitive issues such as racial preferences all
too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify
removing certain court-determined issues from the
voters‟ reach. Democracy does not presume that some
subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public
debate.27
In short, the democratic process “is impeded, not advanced, by court
decrees based on the proposition that the public cannot have the requisite
repose to discuss certain issues.”28
The plurality also recognized that excessive judicial intervention
undermines personal liberty. Justice Kennedy wrote that “our
constitutional system embraces . . . the right of citizens to debate so they
can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in
concert to try to shape the course of their own times and the course of a
nation that must strive always to make freedom ever greater and more
secure.”29 Liberty, therefore, is not defined solely by outcomes, but also
“embraces the right, indeed the duty, to engage in a rational, civic
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 343.
Schuette, 134 S.Ct.at 1630 (plurality opinion).
Id. (alteration to original in quoted text).
Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)).
Id. at 1638.(emphasis added)
Id. at 1637.
Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1637.
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discourse in order to determine how best to form a consensus to shape
the destiny of the Nation and its people.”30

2. Rejecting an Unprincipled Expansion of the Political
Process Doctrine
The Court rejected an expansive reading of the political process
doctrine,31 and distinguished three earlier cases that the petitioner and
Sixth Circuit had deemed controlling. First, in Reitman v. Mulkey,32
voters amended the California Constitution to prohibit the state from
interfering with an owner‟s decision to refuse to sell residential property,
regardless of the reason.33 The Court held that the amendment violated
equal protection principles because the “immediate design and intent”34
of the amendment was to “establis[h] a purported constitutional right to
privately discriminate.”35 It also “significantly encourage[d] and
involve[d] the State in private racial discriminations.”36
In Hunter v. Erickson,37 the Court created the political process
doctrine, which prohibits states from “alter[ing] the procedures of
government to target racial minorities.”38 The Hunter Court invalidated a
voter-approved amendment to the city charter requiring that all antidiscrimination laws be passed through the referendum process.39 Voters
passed the amendment in response to a fair housing ordinance that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race,40 in an area “where
widespread racial discrimination . . . led to segregated housing, forcing
many to live in „unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded
conditions.‟”41 Given this context, the Court rejected the city‟s argument
that the amendment was “simply . . . a public decision to move slowly in
30

Id.
See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1967) (“Like the law requiring
specification of candidates‟ race on the ballot . . . § 137 places [a] special burden on
racial minorities within the governmental process. This is no more permissible than
denying them the vote, on an equal basis with others.”) (alteration to original in quoted
text).
32
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
33
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631 (plurality opinion).
34
Id. (quoting Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374).
35
Id. (alteration in original).
36
Id. (alterations in original).
37
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385 (1969).
38
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014)
(plurality opinion).
39
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
40
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at
391).
41
Id.
31
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the delicate area of race relations.”42 Instead, it was a thinly veiled
justification to continue discriminatory practices.43 Also, by requiring
that only anti-discrimination ordinances be approved by referendum, the
amendment “place[d] [a] special burden on racial minorities within the
governmental process.”44
Finally, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,45 voters
passed a state initiative that prohibited busing to desegregate schools.46
In doing so, the initiative “remov[ed] the authority to address a racial
problem—and only a racial problem—from the existing decision making
body, in such a way as to burden minority interests.”47 Specifically, the
initiative forced busing advocates to “seek relief from the state
legislature, or from the statewide electorate,”48 by using the “racial
nature of a decision to determine the decision making process.”49
Moreover, the initiative “was carefully tailored to interfere only with
desegregative busing,”50 and thus resulted in an “aggravation of the very
racial injury in which the State itself was complicit.”51
Thus, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 and other cases,
the laws at issue presented a “serious risk, if not purpose, of causing
specific injuries on account of race,”52 and made it more difficult to
achieve change through the legislative process. In Schuette, however,
neither discrimination nor the likelihood of serious injury to minority
groups was reducible from a color-blind policy.53 Furthermore, the
plurality refused to construe the political process doctrine so broadly that
it would apply strict scrutiny to “any state action with a „racial focus‟54
that makes it „more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other
groups‟ to „achieve legislation that is in their interest.‟”55 That would
force the Court to identify interests that were common to particular
minority groups, and risk precisely the type of “impermissible racial
42

Id.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44
Id. (alterations to original in quoted text).
45
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
46
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (plurality opinion).
47
Id. at 1633 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 454, 474 (1982)) (alteration to original
in quoted text).
48
Id. (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 474).
49
Id.
50
Id. (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 471).
51
Id.
52
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633.
53
See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967) (“Save
and unless the state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a federally protected
right, it has vast leeway in the management of its internal affairs.”).
54
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Hunter, 385 U.S. at 395).
55
Id.
43
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stereotyp[ing]”56 that equal protection principles prohibit. Justice
Kennedy stated as follows:
Were courts to embark upon this venture not only would
it be undertaken with no clear legal standards or
accepted sources to guide judicial decision but also it
would result in, or at least impose a high risk of,
inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning
stereotypes,
classifications
of
questionable
constitutionality on their own terms.57
The plurality refused to assume that “members of the same racial
group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live—think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”58 Indeed, if “it
were deemed necessary to probe how some races define their own
interest in political matters, still another beginning point would be to
define individuals according to race.”59 Therefore, a broad application of
the political process doctrine had “no principled limitation . . . [or]
support in precedent.”60 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to
identify laws that “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority” 61 or
are “in their interest.”62
The plurality emphasized that issues involving affirmative action,
and other matters of social policy that cannot be said to violate the
Constitution, should be resolved through the democratic process. By
banning race-based preferences, “the Michigan voters exercised their
privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of their democratic power.”63
In so holding, the plurality recognized that “freedom does not stop with
individual rights . . . [and] consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of
the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of
governmental power.”64 Thus, “courts may not disempower the voters

56

Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)) (alteration to original in
quoted text).
57
Id. at 1634-35.
58
Id. (citing Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
59
Id.
60
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
61
Id. at 1635 (quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 472, 474) (alteration to original in
quoted text).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1636-37.
64
Id. (alteration to original in quoted text).
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from choosing which path to follow [on the use of race-based
preferences].”65

B.

Justice Sotomayor‟s Blistering Dissent

Justice Sotomayor began her uncharacteristically pointed dissent by
writing that “[w]e are fortunate to live in a democratic society,”66 and
discussed the perils of judge-made law.67 Then, she did exactly what she
cautioned against.
To begin with, Justice Sotomayor wrote that Proposition 2 reflected
the “last chapter of discrimination,”68 in a long and disgraceful history
that she reminded the Court of in great detail. After discussing the “long
and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to
participate in the political process,”69 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that
“our Constitution places limits on what a majority of the people may
do.”70 In this case, despite conceding that Proposition 2 did not
invidiously discriminate and would not necessarily have a disparate
impact on minority groups,71 Justice Sotomayor argued that the Equal
Protection Clause imposed those limits.
Instead, Proposition 2 violated a “strand of our equal protection
jurisprudence [that] focuses on process, securing to all citizens the right
to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government.”72 As Justice
Sotomayor explained, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a political
structure that “subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to
place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve
beneficial legislation.”73 That doctrine applied here because Michigan‟s
voters “changed the basic rules of the political process . . . by amending
the Michigan Constitution to enact Art. I, § 26 . . . .”74
The change Justice Sotomayor spoke against was change in a
democratic sense. The Michigan Constitution, like its federal
counterpart, gave voters the right to seek change through the amendment
process. To Justice Sotomayor, the amendment process was the wrong
65

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1652.
69
Id. at 1651.
70
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634.
71
Id. at n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I of course do not mean to suggest that
Michigan‟s voters acted with anything like the invidious intent . . . of those who
historically stymied the rights of racial minorities.”).
72
Id. at 1651 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 1653 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467
(1982)).
74
Id. at 1653-54 (emphasis added).
66
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kind of democracy solely because the result “uniquely disadvantaged
racial minorities.”75 Therefore, the solution was to restrict, not expand,
the channels by which voters could seek change. Indeed, Justice
Sotomayor argued that voters could petition “each institution‟s governing
board,76 whose members were “nominated by political parties and
elected by the citizenry in statewide elections.”77 This included
“persuad[ing] existing board members to change their minds through
individual or grassroots lobbying efforts, or through general public
awareness campaigns.”78 But nowhere else, and certainly not through the
democratic process.
What makes this particularly alarming is that “Michigan‟s elected
boards „delegated admissions-related decision making authority to
unelected university faculty members and administrators.‟”79 As Justice
Breyer wrote in his concurrence, even if there was a change in the
political process, it was to remove this issue from “unelected actors and
place it in the hands of the voters.”80 Tellingly, Justice Sotomayor found
fault with an inherently democratic process that she equated to “stacking
the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the
minority alone to surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals.”81
Make no mistake, Justice Sotomayor wanted to cut off the amendment
process for only those voters seeking to ban race-conscious admissions
policies, and to compel them to seek policy change solely from
unelected—and unaccountable—faculty members. Anyone who has been
to a faculty meeting knows that change in this forum is like trying to
convince an originalist that the Constitution‟s meaning is best understood
by looking to the European Court of Human Rights.
Put differently, Justice Sotomayor would have placed specific limits
on the then-minority‟s ability to “participate meaningfully and equally in
self-government.”82 In so doing, Justice Sotomayor targeted a specific
group in the same manner that she deemed unconstitutional when applied
to the group she favored. And she used the political process doctrine to
make the political process less accessible to voters and those who
opposed affirmative action. This violated the precedent upon which
Justice Sotomayor relied, and the principle—equality—that she sought to
protect.
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 1652.
Id.
Id.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (alteration to original in quoted text).
Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1654.
Id. at 1651.
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To be sure, although the administration of race-conscious policies
was “in the hands of each institution‟s governing board,”83 it did not
prevent citizens from seeking policy change through an amendment
process that had been in place for nearly a century.84 In doing precisely
that, voters changed what the law said, not how changes to the law could
be made. Moreover, the notion that voters were “stacking the political
process against minority groups”85 also begged the question why voters
would “undertake the daunting task of amending the State
Constitution,”86 as the preferred method to execute such a plan. As
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, if the voters sought to ban raceconscious policies through the university‟s governing boards, “it would
have made it harder not easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative
action to overturn that decision.”87 Indeed, “voting in a favorable board
(each of which has eight members) at the three major public universities
requires electing by majority vote at least 15 different candidates, several
of whom would be running during different election cycles.”88
Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent embraced a results-driven
jurisprudence that, although courageous and well-intentioned, was not
supported by the Court‟s precedent nor by the Constitution‟s text.
Furthermore, the reasoning would have led to an unreasonable,
unworkable, and unconstitutional expansion of the political process
doctrine. Coming from a life-tenured and unelected judge, that makes it
dangerous—and undemocratic. Unlike Reitman, Hunter, and
Washington, where voters prohibited the state from remedying
discrimination, barred new anti-discrimination laws (except by
referendum), and banned a practice intended to desegregate schools,
Michigan‟s voters did not restructure the political processes in a way that
disadvantaged certain minority groups seeking change. The voters did
not block the state from enforcing or expanding anti-discrimination
efforts. As Justice Breyer explained in his concurring opinion, Hunter
and Seattle involved efforts to “manipulate the political process in a way
not here at issue.”89 Furthermore, by attacking Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Sotomayor wrote with the wrong kind of candor.

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651.
Id. at 1645-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1653.
Id. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia‟s Concurrence

Justice Scalia‟s concurrence argued that, absent a discriminatory
intent, impact, or a true subversion of the democratic process, laws that
treat people equally do not violate the Equal Protection Clause:
Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbid what its text plainly requires?
Needless to say (except that this case obliges us to say
it), the question answers itself. “The Constitution
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of
race, and state-provided education is no exception.” It is
precisely
this
understanding—the
correct
understanding—of the federal Equal Protection Clause
that the people of the State of Michigan have adopted for
their own fundamental law. By adopting it, they did not
simultaneously offend it.90
On the other hand, if “a public university . . . stake[d] its defense of a
race-based-admissions policy on the ground that it was designed to
benefit primarily minorities (as opposed to all students, regardless of
color, by enhancing diversity), we would hold the policy
unconstitutional.”91
As Justice Scalia recognized, the political process doctrine
cannot lead to a workable equal protection jurisprudence. Specifically,
“[t]he problems with the political-process doctrine begin with its
triggering prong, which assigns to a court the task of determining
whether a law that reallocates policymaking authority concerns a „racial
issue.‟”92 To answer that question, judges would be required to “focus
their guesswork on their own juridical sense of what is primarily for the
benefit of minorities,”93 and ask whether “minorities may consider the
policy in question to be „in their interest.‟”94 Such a task necessarily
“involves judges in the dirty business of dividing the Nation „into racial
blocs‟ . . . [and] promotes the noxious fiction that, knowing only a
person‟s color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he has a predetermined
set of policy „interests.‟”95 Moreover, it “reinforc[es] the perception that
90
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members of the same racial group . . . think alike, [and] share the same
political interests.”96 Perhaps Justice Sotomayor is better situated to
identify minority interests because she is a member of a minority group.
But to make that suggestion is to harbor assumptions that are born of
ignorance, stereotype, and prejudice. It has no place in the world of
constitutional jurisprudence—or anywhere else.
Additionally, the dissent failed to explain “why the election of a
university‟s governing board is a „political process which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,‟ but why
Michigan voters‟ ability to amend their Constitution is not.”97 Justice
Scalia stated as follows:
It seems to me quite the opposite. Amending the
Constitution requires the approval of only “a majority of
the electors voting on the question.” Mich. Const., Art.
XII, § 2. By contrast, voting in a favorable board (each
of which has eight members) at the three major public
universities requires electing by majority vote at least 15
different candidates, several of whom would be running
during different election cycles . . . So if Michigan
voters, instead of amending their Constitution, had
pursued the dissent‟s preferred path of electing board
members promising to “abolish race-sensitive
admissions policies,” . . . it would have been harder, not
easier, for racial minorities favoring affirmative action to
overturn that decision.98
Scalia also questioned Justice Sotomayor‟s argument that “amending
Michigan‟s Constitution is simply not a part of that State‟s „existing‟
political process.”99 He stated as follows:
What a peculiar notion: that a revision of a State‟s
fundamental law, made in precisely the manner that law
prescribes, by the very people who are the source of that
96
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law‟s authority, is not part of the “political process”
which, but for those people and that law, would not
exist. This will surely come as news to the people of
Michigan, who, since 1914, have amended their
Constitution 20 times.100
The amendment did not alter “the basic rules of the political process
in . . . the middle of the game,”101 but instead used an essential part of
that process, “through which citizens could seek legislative change.”102
Michigan‟s voters chose to create a color-blind society; it would be
“shameful for us to stand in their way,”103 and “doubly shameful to
equate „the majority‟ behind § 26 with „the majority‟ responsible for Jim
Crow.”104 As Justice Scalia stated, “no good can come of such random
judicial musing.”105

D.
Chief Justice Roberts Concurs—and Responds to Justice
Sotomayor
Chief Justice Roberts chastised Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent as
“devot[ing] 11 pages to expounding its own policy preferences in favor
of taking race into account in college admissions.”106 Roberts also
highlighted the irony in the dissent‟s statement: it “do[es] not . . . suggest
that the virtues of adopting race-sensitive admissions policies should
inform the legal question before the Court.”107 He also questioned Justice
Sotomayor‟s conclusion that governing boards may permissibly decide to
ban race-based preferences in university admissions, “[b]ut others
[voters] who might reach the same conclusion are failing to take race
seriously.”108
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts defended his statement that “the way
to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.”109 Roberts wrote that it was not “out of touch with reality
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to conclude that racial preferences . . . do more harm than good.”110
Roberts also wrote that disagreement “on the costs and benefits of racial
preferences is not to „wish away, rather than confront‟ racial
inequality.”111 Rather, “[p]eople can disagree in good faith on this issue,
but it similarly does more harm than good to question the openness and
candor of those on either side of the debate.”112

III.

WHO WAS RIGHT, AND WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT?

No Justice was entirely correct, and none were entirely wrong.
Justice Sotomayor correctly noted that racism and social inequality—
both public and private—still exist. Their effects have, among other
things, caused many to live in poverty, led to inequality in our
educational system, and unequal treatment in the criminal justice system.
Justice Sotomayor was wrong, however, to embrace a view of the equal
protection clause that would have deprived Michigan from not
discriminating, and to suggest that, in fact, they were required to
discriminate. No reading of the Constitution, and no reasonable
conception of equality, could support such a proposition. The equal
protection clause does not compel the states to treat people differently on
the basis of race. Nor does it prohibit states from passing laws that treat
people the same, particularly where neither a discriminatory intent nor a
strong likelihood of disparate impact is present.
Just as the Constitution constrains majorities, so too does it constrain
the Court. Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent was not about imposing
constitutional constraints on democratic majorities. Those constraints,
when properly applied, are an essential element of a constitutional
democracy. Instead, her dissent imposed one Justice‟s subjective
constraints on the citizens of Michigan, and cast aspersions on the Court
itself. If able, Justice Sotomayor might have imposed those constraints
on an entire nation. That is not only a problem. It prevents real solutions.
The Supreme Court and our democratic process do not countenance
such an arrangement. Indeed, if we allow the Court to manipulate—or
ignore—the Constitution‟s text, its own precedent, and duly enacted state
laws then our system of governance will turn on its head. Citizens are left
on the outside looking in, disempowered to act as change agents, and
subject to policy preferences that depend on the Court‟s composition, not
110
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constitutional law. Although Justice Sotomayor is correct that equal and
accessible democratic processes are essential to ensuring liberty for all
races, there is nothing equal or accessible about giving the Court
unrestrained power to right every perceived wrong.
Ultimately, Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent highlights a deeper problem:
we often look to the Court as a right-creating institution, even where the
power to create the right in question is, at best, dubious. That approach
threatens a participatory democracy because judges too often take the
bait. To be sure, although much of the Constitution‟s text is ambiguous,
judges cannot treat it like a political football and massage its language
like clay when they prefer a particular outcome. The text does not mean
what Justice Sotomayor wants it to mean, or what any judge thinks it
should mean. To believe otherwise is to create a top-down system of
governance where Justices can undo the choices of a democratic majority
because they disagree with—or dislike—those choices. Sadly,
disagreement with Michigan‟s decision to ban race-based preferences—
not law—is precisely what drove Justice Sotomayor‟s dissent. What she
tried to do was precisely what no judge should do, no matter how noble
the purpose. As Justice Anthony Kennedy states, “[a]ny society that
relies on nine unelected judges to resolve the most serious issues of the
day is not a functioning democracy.”113 It is no democracy at all.
Justice Sotomayor justifiably called for a candid discussion on racerelated issues. The Court certainly has a role in this discussion. It should,
for example, continue to invalidate laws, like those in Hunter and Seattle
School District that targeted minority groups. In addition, the Court
should take a more active role in enforcing fundamental constitutional
rights. In Gideon v. Wainwright,114 the Court held that indigent criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel.115 Public defender
systems, however, remain underfunded.116 In Strickland v.
Washington,117 the Court created a two-pronged test for determining
counsel‟s effectiveness at trial, but it has rarely found instances where
counsel was, in fact, ineffective.118 Furthermore, the Court can make the
113
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democratic process more equal by, among other things, allowing
Congress to place reasonable limits on corporate and individual
campaign contributions,119 and placing reasonable limits on partisan
redistricting efforts.120 Equal processes lead to fairer outcomes, and allow
citizens of diverse backgrounds and viewpoints to meaningfully
participate in the lawmaking process. Of course, empowering citizens,
not courts, may be the longer path to equality. But it will be the most
enduring—and democratic—one.
Legislators at the state and federal level also have important roles to
play. After Brown, there was much hope that the end of segregation
would mark the beginning of an enduring equality among all races.
Sadly, this has not happened. Many schools remain segregated, or are in
the process of being re-segregated.121 Many African-Americans live in
poverty, receive inadequate education at the primary and secondary level
and receive unfair treatment in the criminal justice system.122 Thus,
reforming failing public schools, and affirming each citizen‟s right to an
equal education through, for example, voucher programs or increased
spending, should be a legislative priority.123 Adequately funding public
defender systems, and ensuring that indigent criminal defendants receive
effective legal representation, is also critical.124 Likewise, legislators
should aggressively curb state-sanctioned racial profiling, and courts
should invalidate voter suppression laws, and unconstitutional
gerrymandering schemes.125 These are but a few examples to show that,
yes, race still matters. So too does misguided judging.
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CONCLUSION

There are compelling reasons to support affirmative action programs.
The effects of racial discrimination, and racism itself, remain prevalent
throughout the country. Pretending otherwise would be to ignore reality.
Arguing that the Equal Protection Clause compels a state to implement
race-based affirmative action programs, however, would make a
mockery of the Constitution. Former Supreme Court Justice Hughes
famously stated, “at the constitutional level where we work, 90 percent
of any decision is emotional.”126 The remaining ten percent is “[t]he
rational part . . . [that] supplies the reasons for supporting our
predilections.”127 It is time for this type of judging to end. Good
intentions do not make good decisions, just like good results do not
necessarily lead to good outcomes. The best outcomes are those that
result from fair—and constitutional—processes. After all, “[i]t is a sordid
business, this divvying us up by race.”128 If we keep dividing, the country
will never be united.
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